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Abstract
In this paper, we treat a universal sense of implementability for a generalized class of 
mechanisms. The concept is a generalization of Sonnenschein (1974) axiomatic characterization. 
Our implementability framework includes the second fundamental theorem of welfare economics 
and is also opened to many kinds of social choice axiomatic characterization problems.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we treat a universal sense of implementability for generalized class of mechanisms. 
The concept is a generalization and integration of Sonnenschein (1974) axiomatic characterization 
and the resent game theoretic mechanism arguments (see, e.g., Mas-Colell et al. 1995; Ch.23). Our 
implementability framework includes the second fundamental theorem of welfare economics and is 
also opened to many kinds of social choice axiomatic characterization problems.
We reconstruct Sonnenschein (1974) argument as a universal implementability problem for 
generalized mechanisms with messages incorporating economy-dependent message structures.1 The 
concept of generalized mechanisms with messages is defined as the class of mechanisms that use 
messages to restrict their strategy sets. To generalize Sonnenschein’s argument for economy-dependent 
response functions is important since for the universal implementability argument, how we take the 
category of all message mechanisms together with the universal domain of all economies is essential.
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1 In Sonnenschein (1974), Propositions 3, 4, 5, and 6 are related to the argument on the minimal dimension of the 
information space like Hurwicz (1960) and Mount and Reiter (1974). His Propositions 1 and 7 were presented 
independently for arguments on the dictionary and the unique up to isomorphism properties, respectively, which we 
generalize here as the universal implementability.
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2 The Mechanism and Implementability
We identify a game with a list of agents (players) characteristics , , with their 
strategy sets , , , i.e., . The set of all characteristics of agents is 
given by . In the following, we consider many kinds of games and the number of agents will be 
treated as a variable. We take, however, a common outcome space for such games uniquely, i.e.,
is taken largely enough to represent all agents’ consequences. A mechanism
is a collection of strategy sets and an outcome function . An economy 
is a finite list of agents’ characteristics, i.e., . We also assume that it is always 
possible to define agent’s strategy set uniquely from his characteristics . The set of all 
economies is denoted by . A social choice function is a function on to . Note that 
the list of agents’ characteristics is sufficient to define a game for each mechanism. 
Let be an operation that derived from an equilibrium concept for games such that defines a 
certain equilibrium strategy profile,  for each 
game . Now fix the number of agents and strategy sets . 
Mechanism is said to implement social choice function under a game 
theoretic equilibrium concept if , that 
is, the outcome can be obtained as the game theoretic equilibrium for any specification of -agents’ 
characteristics , where  is the set of all -agent economies in . (Our 
settings in this section are standard. See, e.g., Mas-Colell et al. 1995; Chapter 23, p. 866.)
Figure 1 : Implementability by Mechanism .
3 A Generalized Mechanism and Implementability
Now we generalize the above definitions on the mechanism and implementability. In the 
above, a mechanism is defied with respect to a fixed number of agents  and their strategy sets, 
. In the following, we treat a mechanism defined on the universal domain . To 
define a mechanism, we assume as before that for each agent’s characteristics , a strategy set  
is uniquely determined. Moreover, we suppose that there is a common space of messages that is 
used to introduce a generalized game structure on those strategy sets. A generalized mechanism (with 
messages)  defines for each , a list , where  is a strategy 
set derived from  for each , is an outcome function  which gives  for 
each list of strategies  an outcome so is not directly dependend on , 
and  is a constraint structure for a generalized 
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game such that for each message , a strategy profile is required to be an element of 
. Set is called a message space and  is called a constraint correspondence. Note that  
may depend on  or at least on each  constructing  for each coordinate .
Any specification of agents’ characteristics  provides for each  a game structure 
  for each . Here, we can also identify a parameterized game structure 
 with the list, , which gives a game structure  for 
each . An equilibrium concept  for is a correspondence on . For each , 
, the set of equilibrium states for , is a subset of , such that for each , 
 defines an equilibrium strategy profile , . So  provides a certain 
equilibrium concept, , for each . The first projection  of 
 is called the set of equilibrium messages for . The implementability triangle in section 2 is 
now generalized as follows.
Figure 2 : Implementability by Generalized Mechanism .
Let  be a social choice correspondence on  to . (Note that here is generally taken 
to be a correspondence.) Mechanism is said to implement social choice 
correspondence under an equilibrium concept for if
. That is, the outcome can be obtained as the set of game 
theoretic equilibrium profiles for all equilibrium messages for each .
4 The Message Mechanism and Universal Implementability
Given a specification of agents’ characteristics or , a generalized mechanism
always defines a parameterized game structure . Also by specifying for each , the set of 
equilibrium messages and a game theoretic equilibrium concept , we obtain an equilibrium 
system of a generalized mechanism with messages. In the following, we call such a generalized 
mechanism together with an equilibrium concept, , a message mechanism. The 
implementability in the previous section can be restated that a social choice correspondence  is 
implemented by a message mechanism. See the diagram in Figure 3.
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Figure 3 : Implementability by Message Mechanism .
In the above, is a function defined from , and as . Also 
note that is a correspondence, so is taken as an element of set .
As we see in the above diagram, the implementability property of message mechanism
is completely described through . In the following, we denote a message mechanism 
by a triple , a message space , an equilibrium message correspondence and an 
economy and message dependent response function , instead of  as long as there is no fear 
of confusion.
It is possible that a social choice correspondence  can be implemented by several different 
message mechanisms. Now we introduce the concept of universal implementability that indicates a 
representative message mechansim for all message mechanisms implementing a certain social choice 
correspondence  together with some axioms. Consider that two message mechanisms  and 
 implement a social choice correspondence  together with some axioms. See the next two 
diagrams.
Figure 4 : Implementability of  by Message Mechanism .
Figure 5 : Implementability of  by Message Mechanism .
We say that message mechanism has a dictionary property to message mechanism if 
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there exists a unique mapping on to such that the following diagram commutes.
Figure 6 : The Dictionary property of .
Mechanism is said to have the universal implementability if has the dictionary 
property for all message mechanism implementing social choice correspondence
together with some axioms. 
5 Examples
1. Let us consider that  is the class of all Arrow-Debreu economies with commodities. The 
number of agents, for consumers and for producers, are taken as variables. Consider that 
the social choice correspondence is the correspondence of Pareto optimal allocations for each 
 and the outcome space is taken as a large space that can represent every consumption 
allocation for finite economies. Also consider message space , where is a 
normalized space of prices of commodities and denotes the number of consumers in , 
so a message defines -prices together with a wealth distribution for each 
. Then, by identifying  with a solution concept that defines a unique utility maximization 
behavior for each consumer and a unique profit maximization behavior for each producers for each 
, and  with the Marshallian demand or supply function, we obtain an economic price-
wealth message mechanism.
The second welfare theorem is nothing but the statement that every Pareto-optimal social choice 
function can be implemented through such a (price-wealth) message mechanism.
By adding a condition that the utility and profit maximization points for each agent in each  
are unique, (e.g., by assuming the strong convexity conditions for preferences and technologies of 
economies in ,) together with the following Axiom S (an economy-dependent extension of the 
axiom in Sonnenschein 1974), we can also obtain the universal implementability of the price-wealth 
message mechanism.
Axiom S: For each finite list of agents and economies, , each message 
 and each list of responses , there exists an economy  
including  such that  is an equilibrium message for  for which the equilibrium 
list  is an extension of .
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2. Our universal implementability framework is economy-dependent (with respect to messages) in 
the sense that we treat the difference between the names of economies as essential. More 
precisely, in the definition of , and can be distinguished since their agent index 
sets and are different even when  and . In Sonnenschein (1974), 
an economy is completely identified with the finite list of agents’ characteristics (all domains of the 
family are treated as the same as long as they have the same cardinality).
Sonnenschein (1974) uses the Axiom S (non-economy dependent version) to show the universal 
implementability of the price mechanism for the core compatible social choice correspondence. It 
is also possible to weaken Axiom S to a condition based merely on utility levels (see Shiraishi et 
al. 2017). As the second welfare theorem, a core limit result is also possible to be identified with 
a universal implementability theorem (see Urai and Murakami 2016b, Urai and Murakami 2016a, 
Murakami and Urai 2017a and Murakami and Urai 2017b).
3. Axiom S also provides a unified method to characterize the price and/or the price-money message 
mechanisms through the concept of universal implementability. Our result, Urai and Murakami (2017), 
treats the monotonicity and incentive compatibility to characterize the price-money mechanism.
From the purely mathematical viewpoint, Sonnenschein (1974) uses the concept of universal 
element instead of the universal implementability or the universal mapping problem. It is  also possible 
to treat the relation between the universal element and universal mapping through the representable 
functor. For example, the universal mapping property can be related to the problem of representable 
functor as follows.
Let  be a category of mechanisms , . Define subcategory 
 as all objects of  that satisfies the axioms necessary to a dictionary theorem. Then 
 of  and a family of morphisms  constitute a cone (Goldblatt 1979; p.58). 
If  is in , the cone becomes a limit,  (Kato 2006; p.22). Hence, price-money 
mechanism is characterized as the unique mechanism that can represent all message mechanisms 
having the dictionary property with several axioms. It is also possible to express the above arguments 
in terms of the notion of a representable functor (Kato 2006; pp.21-24).
The representation problem will be treated in our succeeding paper. 
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